



# **KOSOVO FUTURE STATUS PROCESS KNOWLEDGE-ATTITUDES-PRACTICES (KAP) SURVEY**

**FINAL REPORT**

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: KEY FINDINGS

The main objective of the Knowledge-Attitudes-Practices survey (KAPS) on the Kosovo Future Status process is to give political and civic stakeholders a more nuanced understanding of public opinion concerning the negotiations process and the negotiations issues to facilitate reaching an agreement status that is widely accepted. The survey's final report covers three core topics: (A) Public Opinion about the Future Status Talks; (B) Public Opinion about the Negotiation Issues; and (C) Persuasion for a Negotiated Settlement. The report focuses mainly on response data for four stakeholder groups: Kosovo Albanians, Kosovo Serbs, Kosovo Serb IDPs living in Serbia, and Serbia Serbs. Some public opinion findings are also provided for Kosovo Others and Serbia Others, which means minority community (e.g., Turks, Bosniaks, Roma, Gorani, Croats) respondents living in Kosovo and Serbia. The key findings of the Knowledge-Attitudes-Practices survey (KAPS) on the Kosovo Future Status process are summarized below.

### A. Public Opinion about the Future Status Talks

- Virtually everyone in all four of the survey's main groups—Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo Serb, Kosovo Serb IDP living in Serbia, and Serbia Serb—assigns considerable importance to both the economy and Kosovo's future status as an issue.
- More than 75% of Kosovo Albanians and approximately 65% of each of the three Serb groups agree or strongly agree that *"no matter how difficult negotiations can be, the only fair way to settle the future status of Kosovo is through the talks in Vienna."* Strong majorities of Kosovo Albanians, Kosovo Serbs, and Kosovo Serb IDPs also ascribe personal importance to *"achieving a permanent agreement on the future status of Kosovo by the end of the year."*
- The same range of consensus does not exist, however, on the question of whether a referendum in Kosovo or negotiation is the best way to decide the future status of Kosovo. A majority (54%) of Kosovo Albanians prefer that the people in Kosovo vote in a referendum, 13% prefer negotiations, and 33% weigh the two process options about equally. In sharp contrast, 86% of Kosovo Serbs and 74% of Kosovo Serb IDPs, and a majority of Serbia Serbs (55%) prefer negotiations as the best way to decide Kosovo's status.
- When asked *"how satisfied you are with the way the Kosovo Future Status talks taking place in Vienna are going,"* more than three-quarters of Kosovo Albanians express moderate to high satisfaction compared to only 12-16% of the three Serb groups.
- Differences among the groups also exist on whether the UN Security Council should step in and impose a solution *"if the Kosovo future status talks seem to be getting nowhere by the end of 2006."* While 55% of Kosovo Albanians answer in the affirmative, more than 80% of Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Serbian IDPs, and more than 70% of Serbia Serbs, oppose this idea.
- While Kosovo Albanians are optimistic and all Serb groups are pessimistic about the prospects for reaching a negotiated future status agreement through the Vienna talks, majorities in three of the main groups (Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo Serb, and Kosovo Serb IDP) say they would join a public rally to support the *"Kosovo future status talks if it looks like the talks are going to fail."*

## B. Public Opinion about Negotiation Proposals

### *“Core” issue of Kosovo’s Future Status*

- Public opinion on the future status issue among Kosovo Albanians is relatively uncompromising on future status proposals--this group is overwhelmingly in favor of full independence for Kosovo and believes that other options are unacceptable. On the Serb side, public opinion varies more widely, with nearly 80% of Kosovo Serbs, 67% of Kosovo Serb IDPs, and 60% of Serbia Serbs reporting it is “essential” for a future status agreement that Kosovo remains inside of Serbia as one province with very wide autonomy.
- However, this survey’s results indicate some flexibility in Serb public opinion on the status question. Over one-third of Kosovo Serbs, nearly two in five Kosovo Serb IDPs, and over 60% of Serbia Serbs state that their preferred status outcome is *not* essential or the outcome preferred by Kosovo Albanians (i.e., some form of independence) is at least tolerable. Overall, Serbia Serbs appear more willing to accept the preferred status outcome of Kosovo Albanians than are Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Serb IDPs.
- Opinions among Serbia Serbs appear to have undergone some changes over the past year. In the 2005 Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe (CDRSEE) “Peace Poll” in Kosovo and Serbia, 87% of Serbia Serbs found full independence for Kosovo unacceptable, and 71% found “independence after a fixed period of adjustment” unacceptable; the corresponding KAP survey figures released today are 74% and 50%. By contrast, the opinions of Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs about future status proposals appear to have changed little, or to have become more “uncompromising,” over the past year when compared against the 2005 “Peace Poll” data.
- Public opinion among Kosovo Others and Serbia Others is much less intense and more compromising on future status proposals than the survey’s four main groups. Kosovo minorities traditionally oriented toward Albanians (i.e., Turks, Ashkali, Egyptians, Bosniaks) find full Kosovo independence “essential” at a level of 57%, and Serb-oriented minorities in Kosovo (Roma and Gorani) report full independence is “unacceptable” at the level of 69%. The same pattern holds for the minority community respondents in Serbia, with only about half finding full independence “unacceptable.” Overall, KAPS finds that over 90% of Serb-oriented Kosovo Others are open to compromise on the status question, followed by Serbia Others at 74%, and then Albanian-oriented Kosovo Others at 56%.

### *“Technical issues”*

- Technical issue proposals are less polarized than the future status issue proposals. Majorities of all four main groups take middle positions on over half of the survey’s technical issue proposals, with approximately two-thirds of both Serbia Serbs and Kosovo Albanians doing so. And, over 85% of Albanian-oriented “Kosovo Other” respondents are classified as “open” on the technical issues, along with two-thirds each of Serb-oriented Kosovo Others and Serbia Others.
- For the minority rights and cultural heritage issues, there is a good amount of public opinion consensus on the desirability of some proposals across all four groups, while majorities in all four groups find proposals for an international military and civil presence and turning Serbian religious/cultural sites into international territories undesirable (though not “unacceptable”). And, on the issue of Serbian government repayments of pre-1989 pensions

and savings to individuals in Kosovo, very few Serb respondents find this proposal “unacceptable” and Kosovo Albanians overwhelmingly approve of it.

- There is much less consensus on the three “pro-Serb” decentralization proposals examined in the survey. Strong majorities in all three Serb groups (60-80%) view these proposals as “essential” to a Kosovo future status agreement, while 50-65% of Kosovo Albanians find two of the proposals “unacceptable” (i.e., increasing the powers of Serb-majority municipalities more so than in other regions, and allowing these municipalities to receive direct financial and other support from the Government of Serbia as long as it is clear how it is used).
- On the status of the city of Mitrovica, Kosovo Albanians are overwhelmingly opposed to the city’s division into two separate municipalities (the proposal advanced by the Serbian Negotiating Team in the Vienna talks), while this option is generally but not overwhelmingly favored by Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Serb IDPs. The majority of Kosovo Albanians are also opposed to making Mitrovica a single city with two distinct districts (the alternative proposal submitted by the Kosovo Negotiating Team in the Vienna talks in May 2006). However, over 40% of Kosovo Albanians find this second proposal at least tolerable, along with at least 75% of each of the three Serb groups.
- Regarding the proposal for an international guarantee of Kosovo’s status in any negotiated settlement, Kosovo Albanians are strongly in favor, Kosovo Serbs strongly opposed, and majorities in the two other Serb groups find this proposal at least tolerable.

#### *Willingness to Compromise on Negotiations Proposals, and to Support/Protest a Negotiated Agreement*

- One-third to two-fifths of Kosovo Albanians, Kosovo Serbs, and Kosovo Serb IDPs can be classified as “no compromisers” -- those who are unwilling to tolerate the other side’s preferences on both the future status issue and technical issues. Moreover, the majority of “no compromisers” in all four groups are classified as behaviorally engaged or activists. These figures suggest that a “hard core” of “no compromisers” within each group is very likely to protest a Kosovo future status agreement they perceive as unfair, or, conversely, actively support a perceived fair agreement.
- Overall, the number of compromisers is larger than the number “no compromisers” in each of the four main groups, and “full compromisers” constitute a majority of the two Kosovo Others groups and the Serbia Others group. In addition, the number of “compromise-activists” is also quite large at approximately 45% of Kosovo Albanians and about 30-32%% for Serbia Serbs and Kosovo Serb IDPs. This indicates that there is a larger potential for mobilizing behavioral support for compromise agreements than to mobilize behavioral opposition to agreements that a given ethnic group perceives as unfair.
- Serbia Serbs differ considerably from Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Serb IDPs by having a much less intense behavioral readiness to either protest or support a Kosovo future status agreement.

#### **C. Persuasion for a Negotiated Settlement: Bundles and Counterarguments**

- In response to “bundled” sets of negotiation proposals, movement by both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs toward tolerating the “extreme” future status outcome of the other side was limited, but with some variation. There was only about a 5% movement among Kosovo Serbs, but bundles produced an 11-14 net percentage point change for both Kosovo

Albanians and Serbia Serbs in terms of “tolerating” the other side’s core future status demand.

- Kosovo Albanians appear open to at least tolerating a “conditional independence” status outcome if it is bundled with attractive technical issues outcomes, but the technical issue outcomes offered in the survey’s third bundle were not sufficient to change the position of many Serbs on the “conditional independence” outcome.
- It is relatively easy to generate acceptance of a wide variety of technical issue proposals, provided they are bundled with a status outcome that a given group favors.
- Individuals responded to counterarguments that attempted to change their positions on decentralization. Individuals who initially favored decentralization responded especially to appeals based on the outcome of increased ethnic segregation, and individuals who initially opposed decentralization responded especially to arguments stressing its use in multi-ethnic countries that eventually joined the European Union.
- The ability of counterarguments to persuade individuals in general suggests that public opinion regarding decentralization and by extension, other technical issues, is not indelibly fixed.

## **SECTION ONE: CONTEXT OF KOSOVO'S FUTURE STATUS PROCESS AND PURPOSE OF THE KAP SURVEY**

### **A. Context of Kosovo's Future Status Process**

In late 2005 the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, former President of Finland, as his Special Envoy to lead the political process to determine the future status of Kosovo. This negotiations process formally began in February 2006 with the opening of the so-called "Vienna talks" between representatives of the Kosovo Negotiating Team and the Serbian Negotiating Team, with mediation provided by the Special Envoy or his Deputy, Mr. Albert Rohan of Austria.

Six sessions of the Vienna talks, with shuttle diplomacy in-between sessions, took place from February to June 2006, focusing on "technical issues" related to Kosovo's future status: decentralization, community rights and cultural heritage, Mitrovica, and the economy. No agreement was reached on these issues, but recent shuttle diplomacy has generated some progress toward consensual proposals on selected topics. The Contact Group on Kosovo, made up of the United States, France, Germany, Russia, Great Britain and Italy, continues to actively support the work of the Special Envoy.

Following Ahtisaari's 13 July 2006 report on the future status political process to the United Nations Security Council, negotiations are shifting to the core issue of Kosovo's status with talks involving highest level officials on both sides. This Knowledge-Attitudes-Practices survey (KAPS) report on the Kosovo's Future Status process covers public opinion on the technical issues and "core" status question. As such, the survey's findings enter the public arena at a critical point in the negotiations process when technical issues need resolution and status proposals will be discussed by both sides in face-to-face meetings for the first time.

### **B. Purpose of the Kosovo Future Status Process KAP Survey (KAPS)**

The main objective of the Kosovo Future Status Process KAP survey is to give political and civic stakeholders a more nuanced understanding of public opinion concerning the negotiations process and the negotiations issues to facilitate reaching an agreement on Kosovo's future status that is widely accepted and perceived as fair and just. This survey uses, adapts, and extends a model<sup>1</sup> that views public opinion surveys as a tool to assist stakeholder groups in a negotiations process in situations of political or social conflict to shape proposals that have the greatest chance for sustained public acceptance by:

- Identifying where the public stands on actual or potential negotiation issue proposals;
- Exploring possible areas for compromise by revealing the intensity of different stakeholder groups' preferences on issues, and how proposals might be bundled together to promote acceptance that would be unlikely when individual issues are considered in isolation;
- Testing arguments that political and civic leaders could potentially use to generate acceptance among various ethnic or political communities for a negotiated settlement; and

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<sup>1</sup> This model for surveys in negotiations contexts has been developed and applied by the Academy for Educational Development (AED) in collaboration with Dr. Steven Finkel (University of Pittsburgh and the Hertie School of Governance-Berlin) and Dr. William Mishler (University of Arizona). See AED Center for Democracy and Governance, *The Road to Peace: Using Surveys to Promote the Peace Process: Lessons Learned from the 2003-2004 Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices (KAP) Surveys on the Sri Lankan Peace Process*. Washington, D.C. 2005. Available online at [http://www.aed-ccsg.org/reports/CCSG\\_RoadtoPeace.pdf](http://www.aed-ccsg.org/reports/CCSG_RoadtoPeace.pdf).

- Measuring how the public feels about the negotiations process itself and public intention to protest or support depending on how this process develops and the perceived fairness/unfairness of an eventual settlement.

The Kosovo Future Status Process KAP survey activity is organized by the Academy for Educational Development (AED), a contractor for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), as part of the Support to Peace and Stability in Kosovo Project funded by USAID. AED, an independent, nonprofit organization, engaged two organizations to provide the social science research and analysis services for the survey and corollary focus group discussions: the Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED) in Pristina, and the Strategic Marketing & Media Research Institute (SMMRI) Group with headquarters in Belgrade. Two experts in the use of KAP surveys in negotiation contexts – Dr. Steven Finkel (University of Pittsburgh; Hertie School of Governance in Berlin) and Dr. William Mishler (University of Arizona)—have worked with the research teams from KIPRED and SMMRI on the survey activity and performed the advanced statistical analysis work.

The main emphasis of this report is to provide information concerning the opinions, attitudes, and behavioral intentions of four main stakeholder groups: Kosovo Albanians, Kosovo Serbs, Kosovo Serb IDPs living in Serbia, and Serbia Serbs. In a separate section at the end of report, some information is also provided on public opinion findings for Kosovo Others and Serbia Others, which means minority communities (e.g., Turks, Bosniaks, Roma, Gorani, Croats) living in Kosovo and Serbia. The terminology for referring to groups in the report was agreed upon by the Pristina and Belgrade members of the survey research team as the most appropriate approach given the analytical objectives of the survey activity.

## SECTION TWO: METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

Interviews for the Kosovo Future Status Process KAP survey were conducted in the whole of the territory of Kosovo and in Serbia by SMMRI interviewers from May 10 to May 20, 2006 with the following sub-samples: Kosovo Albanians (N=753); Kosovo Serbs (N=485); Kosovo Serb IDPs living in Serbia (N=248); Kosovo Others (N=300); Serbia Serbs (N=795); and Serbia Others (N=100). The final data set was weighted to represent the demographic specifics of the populations being studied. The weighted data set was used for analysis purposes.<sup>2</sup> The sampling errors for the weighted sub-samples were: Kosovo Albanians (+/-3.94%), Kosovo Serbs (+/-5.06%), Kosovo Serb IDPs (+/-6.82%), Serbia Serbs (+/-3.67%), Kosovo Others (+/-6.8%), and Serbia Others (+/-10.5%).

### A. Main methodological aspects of the survey research

To achieve a highly representative sample, a series of sampling methods were used to reach the respondents in Kosovo and Serbia. First a *systematic sample with random choice* of the starting point and equal steps of choice was used for all the sub-samples. Afterwards, the *quota method* was used for the Kosovo Serb IDPs (living in Serbia) sub-sample where the respondents were selected with probability proportional to number of IDPs, and then combined random and quota sample procedures were applied based on available Red Cross, UNHCR and other lists of IDP households in the given sampling points within the municipality. The *booster method* was utilized in the case of the “Kosovo Others” sub-sample. In this case, the sampling points were selected randomly from the ones that already had fulfilled the criteria of concentration of Gorani, Turks/Bosniaks and Roma/Egyptians. Overall, the sampling procedure was randomized as much as possible in order to avoid possible interviewer bias in selecting respondents.

### B. Interviewer training

Full day interviewer training workshops were organized in Belgrade, Nis, Novi Sad, Mitrovica, and Pristina, accompanied with a full time support system from supervisors and field force managers. These workshops reviewed the survey questionnaire and fieldwork procedures. Each interviewer received a package containing printed questionnaires, the interviewer’s diary form, starting point information (i.e. address from where to start, detailed description of the pass--direction to go, how to count buildings and/or apartments, direction to go on the crossroads), and a letter of authorization. Fieldwork control was implemented on 15 percent of total respondents in Serbia, and 14 percent of total respondents in Kosovo, in all strata proportionally to sample size.


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<sup>2</sup> The KAP survey asked a question on ethnic identification to validate that respondents in fact belonged to the appropriate sub-sample before including them in the analysis sample. The weighted numbers of respondents in the analysis sub-samples were: Kosovo Albanians (N=751); Kosovo Serbs (N=485); Kosovo Serb IDPs living in Serbia (N=248); Kosovo Others (N=297); Serbia Serbs (N=789); and Serbia Others (N=106).

## SECTION THREE: PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT THE KOSOVO FUTURE STATUS TALKS

### A. The Importance of a Future Status Agreement

The KAP survey began by asking respondents living in Kosovo and Kosovo Serb IDPs living in Serbia what they personally considered “the most important problem that Kosovo is facing now.” Serbia Serb respondents were asked about the most important issue facing Serbia. As reported in Figure 3.1, 78% of Kosovo Serb IDPs and 66% of Kosovo Serbs identify the status of Kosovo as



the most important problem. By contrast, 82% of Serbia Serbs and 62% Kosovo Albanians identify some aspect of the economy (unemployment, cost of living, economy) – usually unemployment – as most important.

The strength of these differences in the relative emphasis respondents accorded the economy versus the future status of Kosovo appears relatively modest. Among those in all groups who identify the economy as most important

Figure 3.1: Most Important Issue

problem, 68% say the resolution of Kosovo’s future status is only “somewhat less important,” and 24% say it is “much less important.” Similarly, 68% of respondents in all groups who mention Kosovo’s future status as the most important problem say the state of Kosovo’s (Serbia’s) economy,<sup>3</sup> is only “somewhat less important” and 21% say it is “much less important”. While the magnitude of these differences varies across the four groups and is largest among Kosovo Serb IDPs, the differences are small in absolute terms. Virtually everyone in all four groups assigns considerable importance to both the economy and the Kosovo future status issue, which suggests that many people view these issues as inter-linked.

Large percentages of all four groups also ascribe personal importance to “achieving a permanent agreement on the future status of Kosovo by the end of the year.” Among Kosovo Albanians, 74% say that a permanent agreement by the end of 2006 is “very important” to them personally, and 24% of respondents from this group say it is “fairly important.” Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Serb IDPs hold similar views, with a majority of both groups saying it is personally “very important” that a permanent agreement be reached by the end of the year, and less than 15% saying “not very important” or “not at all important.” On this same question, 43% Serbia Serbs answer “very

<sup>3</sup> Serbia Serb respondents were asked about the state of Serbia’s current economy, while respondents from all the other groups were asked about the state of Kosovo’s current economy.

important,” another third say “somewhat important,” and less than one quarter discount this importance.

### B. Satisfaction with Future Status Talks

While there is a high degree of agreement among the different groups regarding the importance of achieving a permanent Kosovo future status agreement, there is considerable disagreement on the progress of future status talks to date. When asked “*how satisfied you are with the way the Kosovo Future Status talks taking place in Vienna are going,*” more than three-quarters of Kosovo Albanians express moderate to high satisfaction compared to only 12-16% of the three Serb groups (see Figure 3.2). Kosovo Serbs express greatest dissatisfaction with the talks, although Serbia Serbs and Kosovo Serb IDPs are also widely dissatisfied. Moreover, when asked if resolution of the future status of Kosovo had improved over the past year, 49% of Kosovo Albanians say it has, but less than 10% of any of




Figure 3.2: Satisfaction with Future Status Talks (percentage)

the three Serb groups think the same. Approximately 55% of each of the three Serb groups say resolution of Kosovo’s future status has worsened over the past year – a view shared by fewer than 10% of Kosovo Albanians. Kosovo Albanians and Serbs also hold diverging assessments of the prospects for reaching a negotiated agreement about Kosovo’s future status through the talks in Vienna. While nearly 80% of Kosovo Albanians say a negotiated agreement is ‘very likely’ or ‘fairly likely’, 70% of Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Serb IDPs say this is not likely. Serbia Serb respondents are even more pessimistic, with barely 25% believing there is some likelihood of achieving a negotiated agreement through the Vienna talks.

### C. Commitment to the Negotiations Process

Despite such disparate assessments about the progress of future status talks, large majorities of all four groups agree with the statement, “*No matter how difficult negotiations can be, the only fair way to settle the future status of Kosovo is through the talks in Vienna.*” More than three-quarters of Kosovo Albanians either agree or strongly agree, and approximately 65% of each of the three Serb groups agree that continuing the negotiations is the only fair way to resolve the future of Kosovo. When asked if they agree or disagree with the statement, “the best way to decide the future status of Kosovo is to have the people in Kosovo vote in a referendum,” almost 90% of Kosovo Albanians agree or strongly agree. By contrast, 97% of Kosovo Serbs, 85% of Kosovo Serb IDPs, and 71% of Serbia Serbs disagree or strongly disagree with this idea.

When each group's attitudes about negotiations as the fairest way to decide Kosovo's future status are compared with attitudes about a referendum in Kosovo, a majority (54%) of Kosovo Albanians prefer that the people in Kosovo vote in a referendum, 13% prefer negotiations, and 33% weigh the two process options about equally. In sharp contrast, 86% of Kosovo Serbs and 74% of Kosovo Serb IDPs clearly prefer negotiations. Meanwhile, a majority of Serbia Serbs (55%) think negotiations are the best way to decide Kosovo's future status, 14% prefer a referendum, and 31% evaluate the two process options about equally.

Differences among the groups also exist on whether the UN Security Council should step in and impose a solution "if the Kosovo future status talks seem to be getting nowhere by the end of 2006." While 55% of Kosovo Albanians agree or strongly agree with the idea, more than 80% of Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Serbian IDPs and more than 70% of Serbia Serbs oppose it.




Figure 3.3: Future Status Talks Typology (percentage)

To gauge possible behavioral responses to some imposed solution outcome, KAPS asked respondents if they agree or disagree that they "would join with others to try to prevent the United Nations or anyone else from imposing a settlement in Kosovo from the outside" if a Kosovo future status agreement is not reached through negotiations. Nearly 60% of Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Serb IDPs agree, while only 32% of Serbian Serbs agree. Forty-two percent of Kosovo Albanians report they would try to prevent an imposed solution, which suggests that even though a slight majority of Kosovo Albanians favor the imposed solution outcome (presumably expecting a favorable outcome) if negotiations fail, most Kosovo Albanian opponents of this outcome would respond with protest behavior.

Another way to assess the level of public commitment to negotiations is to consider what steps people would be willing to take if the future status talks were in jeopardy of collapsing. In this regard, KAPS asked respondents to agree or disagree with the item, "If it looks like the Kosovo future status talks are going to fail, I would join with others in a public rally to support continuing the negotiations." Sixty percent of Kosovo Albanians agree or strongly agree with this statement, only 12% strongly disagree, and 28% are undecided. This pattern is similar among Kosovo Serb IDPs, with 65% agreeing and only 15% strongly disagreeing. And, for Kosovo Serbs, 54% say they would join a public rally to support the talks, while 19% strongly disagree with this behavior. Serbia Serbs, by contrast, are more ambivalent on this question, with 44% agreeing, 29% say they do not, and 27% are undecided.

A Future Status Talks typology was constructed by comparing those who support or oppose negotiations as the only fair way to settle the future status of Kosovo (Pro- versus Anti-Talks) with those who are willing or unwilling to join others in a public rally to support continued negotiations if the talks were in danger of collapsing (Active versus Passive vis-à-vis the talks). Four Future Status Talk types result. *Pro-Talk Activists* support resolving the future status of Kosovo through

negotiations and will rally in support of failing negotiations. *Pro-Talk Passives* are committed to negotiations but either would not join a rally or are undecided on that question. *Anti-Talk Passives* do not support negotiations and would not join a rally to support them if they were failing. Finally, *Anti-Talk Activists* somewhat incongruously claim that they are not committed to negotiations yet also say that they would join a public rally to support faltering talks.

Figure 3.3 shows that Pro-Talk Activists make up 51% of Kosovo Albanians, 48% of Kosovo Serb IDPs, 41% of Kosovo Serbs, and 29% of Serbia Serbs. By contrast, Anti-Talk Activists are consistently the smallest segment of all four groups, ranging in size from 8% for Kosovo Albanians to 17% for Kosovo Serb IDPs. The size of Pro-Talk Passives and Anti-Talk Passives varies among the four groups, but with Pro-Talk Passives the largest segment of Serbia Serbs at 35%.

## SECTION FOUR: PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT NEGOTIATION PROPOSALS

KAPS asked respondents in Kosovo and Serbia their opinions about two sets of proposals related to the Kosovo future status negotiations process. The first set of proposals concern the “core” issue of Kosovo’s future status – that is, whether Kosovo shall be an independent entity or whether it shall be an autonomous province in Serbia, with various proposals defining potential “independence” or potential “autonomy” in different ways. The second set of proposals concern “technical issues” that have been discussed in the Vienna talks thus far (e.g., decentralization, minority rights, cultural heritage, Mitrovica, economy) and will likely be part of any Kosovo future status agreement.

This section of the report presents public opinion on these so-called “status” and “technical” issue proposals considered separately. While these public opinion findings are interesting in their own right, they will serve as baseline figures later in the report (see Section 5) for testing public opinion about some future status negotiations bundles in which a specific status proposal is “bundled” with some technical issue proposals, something that will likely happen in any eventual Kosovo Future Status negotiated agreement.

### A. “Core” Future Status Proposals




Figure 4.1: Public Opinion on Future Status Proposals

In Figure 4.1, we show the distribution of responses for each of the four groups on four proposals concerning the “core” issue of the future status of Kosovo:

1. Kosovo should be a fully independent state within its present borders
2. Kosovo should be “conditionally independent” that is, an independent state but without things like a separate army and memberships in international organizations until after a fixed period of adjustment
3. Kosovo should remain inside Serbia as one province with very wide autonomy

4. Kosovo should be reorganized into two entities inside Serbia, with the majority-Albanian entity having very wide autonomy

Note that proposals 1 and 3 are those typically identified as the “ideal” or near-ideal outcome for the Kosovo Albanian and Serb communities, respectively, while proposals 2 and 4 are in some sense a lesser preference for these respective groups but still likely to be preferred over either of the other side’s corresponding proposals.

The response options for these status issue proposal questions were:<sup>4</sup>

- Absolutely Necessary [Essential] for a Kosovo Future Status Agreement
- Desirable but not Essential [Desirable] for a Kosovo Future Status Agreement
- Undesirable but I Could Accept It [Tolerable] for a Kosovo Future Status Agreement
- Absolutely Undesirable [Unacceptable] for a Kosovo Future Status Agreement

[Note: To ease the reporting of results, the shortened response options in brackets are reported in the findings below.]

These response options were designed to elicit not simply what the respondent would want in an ideal sense, but also what the respondent could accept or tolerate, or not accept and not tolerate as a future status outcome. Such opinions are perhaps more important to a negotiations process than ideal preferences, as they convey a sense of what is minimally acceptable to all sides, what each side will tolerate on particular issues, and where each side has “dug in its heels” and expressed the sense that certain outcomes are non-negotiable.

Figure 4.1 shows the large gap between the most preferred future status outcome of Kosovo Albanians and the three Serb groups. Around 90% of Kosovo Albanians respond that full independence within Kosovo’s current borders is an “essential” proposal for a future status agreement, while nearly 80% of Kosovo Serbs, 67% of Kosovo Serb IDPs, and 60% of Serbia Serbs report that Kosovo remaining inside of Serbia as one province with very wide autonomy is “essential.” More than 90% of Kosovo Albanians find this more pro-Serbian future status outcome “unacceptable.” Meanwhile, approximately 90% of Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Serb IDPs, and 74% of Serbia Serbs find the full independence outcome “unacceptable.” Thus the preferred outcome, or what may be better characterized as the essential demand, of one ethnic group (Kosovo Albanian or Serb) is seen as “unacceptable” by huge majorities of the other group (Serb or Kosovo Albanian).

These results indicate a highly polarized opinion environment regarding the core issue of Kosovo future status. Upon closer examination, though, it can be seen that this polarization (or “uncompromising” stands) is greatest between two of the four groups: Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs. In fact, Kosovo Serb IDPs are some 10 percentage points *less* likely than Kosovo Serbs to claim the two “pro-Serbian” status outcomes (see issue proposals 3 and 4) as “essential,” and eight percentage points less likely to claim at least one pro-Albanian outcome, “conditional independence,” as “unacceptable.” The opinions of Serbia Serbs are even less “uncompromising,” as only 50% of this group finds “conditional independence” “unacceptable” and, as noted above, only somewhat more than half (60%) find Kosovo remaining in Serbia as one province to be “essential.”

Thus, the key findings of this section include that public opinion on the future status issue among Kosovo Albanians is relatively uncompromising – this group is overwhelmingly in favor of full independence for Kosovo and believes that other options are unacceptable. On the Serb side, public opinion varies much more widely, with Kosovo Serbs being the least willing, and Serbia Serbs

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<sup>4</sup> These response options are modeled after those in other KAP surveys in negotiations contexts (e.g., Sri Lanka), and in the 2005 Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe (CDRSEE) “Peace Poll” survey in Kosovo and Serbia.

the most willing, to at least tolerate a preferred outcome of the other side, which is some form of Kosovo independence. This conclusion is not that Serbia Serbs prefer this outcome over all others, only that they appear to be more willing to accept it than Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Serb IDPs. Opinions among Serbia Serbs appear to have undergone some changes over the past year. In the CDRSEE Peace Poll from August-September 2005, it was reported that 87% of Serbia Serbs found full independence for Kosovo “unacceptable,” and 71% found unacceptable “independence after a fixed period of adjustment;” the corresponding figures in our survey are 74% and 50%. This indicates that along with a greater absolute willingness to tolerate Kosovo independence, as reported in the previous paragraphs, Serbia Serbs are also relatively more willing to tolerate these outcomes than they were in 2005. By contrast, the opinions of Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs about future status proposals appear to have changed little, or to have become more “uncompromising,” over the past year when compared against the 2005 “Peace Poll” data.

To arrive at a more nuanced portrait of the level of willingness to tolerate the outcomes preferred by the other side, we constructed an index to gauge for all respondents whether they found the outcome associated with “their” group (Kosovo Albanian or Serb) to be “essential,” or whether they found the outcome associated with the “other” side (Serb or Kosovo Albanian) to be “unacceptable.” We label Kosovo Albanians as “open” if they either did not respond that full or conditional independence for Kosovo was “essential”, or they did not find either of the two options for Kosovo to remain in Serbia “unacceptable.” We labeled individuals in the three Serb groups as “open” if they either did not label either option for Kosovo to remain in Serbia as “essential,” or if they did not find either option for Kosovo independence “unacceptable.”

As can be seen in Table 4.1, there is more flexibility in status outcome public opinion for the various groups than was immediately apparent from Figure

| <b>Kosovo Albanians</b> | <b>Kosovo Serbs</b> | <b>Kosovo Serb IDPs</b> | <b>Serbia Serbs</b> |
|-------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|
| <b>22.2%</b>            | <b>34.3%</b>        | <b>39.5%</b>            | <b>61.9%</b>        |

4.1. While less than one-quarter of Kosovo Albanians state that their preferred outcome is *not* essential or the outcomes preferred by the other side are at least tolerable, this figure rises to over one-third of Kosovo Serbs, nearly two in five Kosovo Serb IDPs, and over 60% of Serbia Serbs. The results in this table indicate much variation among the Serb groups, including that Serbia Serbs are almost twice as likely as Kosovo Serbs to at least tolerate the future status outcomes favored by Kosovo Albanians, or to claim that Serb-preferred outcomes are not necessarily “essential” to a negotiated agreement.




Figure 4.2a: Public Opinion on Minority Rights and Cultural Heritage Issue Proposals

**B. Technical Issues**

Figures 4.2 (a-c) show the distribution of public opinion in the four groups on the following three categories of technical issue proposals related to a Kosovo Future Status agreement: (1) Protection of Minority Rights and Cultural Heritage, (2) Decentralization, and (3) Other Technical Issues such

as the status of the city of Mitrovica and economic reparations from the Government of Serbia to individuals in Kosovo.

For the minority rights and cultural heritage issues (see Figure 4.2-a), the results suggest there is a good amount of consensus on the desirability of some proposals across all four groups. For example, nearly 90% of all the Serb groups believe that the return of displaced persons to their homes and property is “essential,” while nearly half of Kosovo Albanians share this view and another one-third find it “desirable.” Similar patterns exist for the proposals relating to minority languages and guaranteed representation for minorities in Kosovo’s governing institutions. For other issue proposals, namely those about an international military and civil presence and turning




Figure 4.2b: Public Opinion on Decentralization Issue Proposals

Serbian religious sites into international territories, majorities in all of four groups find them undesirable but public opinion is not focused on the most extreme “unacceptable” response option. Even on several issue proposals where opinion is more polarized – namely keeping major Serbian religious and cultural sites under international protection and enabling Kosovo Serbs to have double citizenship if Kosovo were to become independent in some sense – the Serb group positions range from 40-60% “essential,” and the Kosovo Albanian position is only about 40-50% “unacceptable,” on these two proposals. These figures are far less “intense” than the polarization on the “core” issue of Kosovo’s future status, suggesting that there is considerably less of an “all or nothing” stance in public opinion across the four groups regarding their own groups’ demands and the acceptability of the other side’s preferred outcomes. And, on several issues (e.g., related to minority rights and the return of displaced persons) there is near consensus on the proposals’ desirability or undesirability.

The decentralization issue proposals (see Figure 4.2-b), are more difficult in terms of consensus and polarization. On these three issue proposals, the Serb groups all register 60-80% “essential” responses, while 50-65% of Kosovo Albanians find two of the proposals “unacceptable”: (1)




Figure 4.2c: Public Opinion on Mitrovia and Other Technical Issue Proposals

increasing the power of Serb-majority municipalities more so than in other regions, and (2) allowing these municipalities to receive direct financial and other support from the Government of Serbia as long as it is clear how it is used. Among Kosovo Albanians, there is a relatively low “unacceptable” figure of 31% on only the proposal to allow formal linkages between Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo for cooperation in areas like education and health care. Still, the decentralization issue proposals are nevertheless less polarized than the future status issue proposals in the sense that many fewer respondents find decentralization issue proposals either “unacceptable” or “essential” for a negotiated agreement.

Turning to the remaining issue proposals (see Figure 4.2-c), there is a clear lack of consensus regarding the four groups’ opinions on the resolution of the status of the city of Mitrovia. Kosovo Albanians are overwhelmingly opposed to the division of the city into two separate municipalities (the proposal advanced by the Serbian Negotiating Team in the Vienna talks in May 2006), while this option is generally but not overwhelmingly favored by Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Serb IDPs. Serbia Serb public opinion is equally divided across all four response options. The majority of Kosovo Albanians are also opposed to making Mitrovia a single city with two distinct districts with equal and extensive powers (the alternative proposal submitted by the Kosovo Negotiating Team in the Vienna talks in May 2006), although over 40% of this group finds this proposal at least tolerable, along with at least 75% of each of the three Serb groups. On the issue of Serbian government repayments of pre-1989 pensions and savings to individuals in Kosovo, Kosovo Albanians are overwhelmingly in favor while Serb groups are also agreeable (though not as strongly) with very few Serb respondents finding this proposal “unacceptable.” Finally, on the proposal related to an international guarantee of Kosovo’s status in any negotiated settlement, Kosovo Albanians are strongly in favor, Kosovo Serbs strongly opposed, and majorities in the two other Serb groups find this proposal at least tolerable.

The results in this section suggest that public opinion on the technical issues is relatively polarized across the different groups, but that, overall, there is more willingness among all the groups to compromise on these issues than on the “core” issue of Kosovo’s future status. To further assess the willingness to compromise on technical issues, we first analyzed Serb and Kosovo Albanian

response data for each technical issue proposal to determine which proposals are inherently “conflictual” (public opinion is polarized among Serb and Kosovo Albanian respondents) versus “consensual” (public opinion leans in the same direction among Serb and Kosovo Albanian respondents). Next, we scored individual respondents as “open” or “closed” on each technical issue in the survey using the following approach: (a) for “conflictual” technical issue proposals such as the decentralization ones, we scored individual respondents as “open” if they answer “desirable” (response option 2) or “tolerable” (response option 3)—that is, the respondent does not take an “extreme” or “uncompromising” position; and (b) for “consensual” technical issue proposals such as the right to return for refugees and displaced persons from Kosovo, we scored individual respondents as “open” if they did not answer “unacceptable” (response option 4). Last, we labeled individuals “open” overall on the Technical Issues if they received an “open” score *on more than half* of the 14 technical issue proposals. The distribution of “open” individuals for each of the four main groups is shown below in Table 4.2.

| Kosovo Albanians | Kosovo Serbs | Kosovo Serb IDPs | Serbia Serbs |
|------------------|--------------|------------------|--------------|
| 63.1%            | 52.4%        | 50.6%            | 67.5%        |

As can be seen, majorities of all groups take

middle positions on over half of the technical issue proposals, with approximately two-thirds of both Serbia Serbs and Kosovo Albanians doing so. The findings suggest there is some room compromise in the negotiation process, at least on technical issues related to Kosovo’s future status. It is relatively less common for individuals in the four groups to express a non-negotiable demand for a given outcome, or to feel that a given outcome is “unacceptable,” on technical issues. As on the core status issue, though, there is more distance between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs (and also Kosovo Serb IDPs) than between Kosovo Albanians and Serbia Serbs on the technical issues.

It is also instructive to examine the distribution of respondents within each ethnic group on *both* the status and technical issues in terms of their willingness to tolerate the preferred outcomes of the other side. We may classify respondents as either “open” or “closed” on the core future status issue, as shown in Table 4.1, and as “open” or “closed” on the technical issues, as shown in Table 4.2.

This cross-classification of respondents within each of the four groups yields the distribution of “compromisers” shown in Figure 4.3. “No compromisers” are unwilling to tolerate the other side’s preferences on both the “core” future status issue and technical issues, while “full compromisers” are willing to tolerate




Figure 4.3: Negotiation Compromisers




Figure 4.4: Readiness to support or protest

findings for the potential for compromising stances on issue proposals in the negotiations process. Nearly half of Kosovo Albanians fall into the category of “technical issue compromisers”, with another 17% classified as “full compromisers.” For Kosovo Serb IDPs and Kosovo Serbs, 22-24% are classified as “full compromisers,” another 25-28% as “technical issue compromisers,” and 10-17% are “core compromisers.” And, 48% of Serbia Serbs fall into the category of “full

the other side’s “core” and technical issue preferences. “Technical issue compromisers” are willing to tolerate the other side’s preferred outcomes only on technical issues, while “core compromisers” show this toleration for only the other side’s preferences on the “core” future status issue.

Several findings from Figure 4.3 are particularly noteworthy. First, approximately one-third to two-fifths of Kosovo Albanians, Kosovo Serbs, and Kosovo Serb IDPs are classified as “no compromisers.” but only 18% of Serbia Serbs are “no compromisers.” The considerable size of no compromisers in three of the four groups suggests a difficult opinion environment for the future status negotiations process. Yet, a closer study of the figures yields more hopeful

compromisers,” which is a large percentage open to possible compromises on technical issues and relatively undemanding on the core future status issues.

### C. Willingness to Protest or Support a Negotiated Agreement

To examine individuals’ behavioral tendencies to protest or support a Kosovo future status negotiated settlement, KAPS asked the intensity of agreement with the following four statements:

- a. *If there is a Kosovo future status agreement that I think is unfair, I will join with others to protest against it.*
- b. *If there is a Kosovo future status agreement that I think is FAIR, I will join with members of my own ethnic group to support it.*
- c. *If there is a Kosovo future status agreement that I think is FAIR, I will join with members of other ethnic groups to support it, even if members of my own ethnic group don’t like it.*
- d. *If a Kosovo future status agreement is NOT reached, I will vote against any political party that I think prevented an agreement from happening [that was a “spoiler”]*

We present the distribution of responses for each of the four main groups in Figure 4.4.

For Kosovo Albanians, Kosovo Serbs, and Kosovo Serb IDPs, there is a very high degree of self-reported readiness to become engaged about any eventual future status agreement – either in a supportive way for an agreement that is perceived to be fair, or in the form of protest against an agreement that is perceived to be unfair. Majorities of Kosovo Albanians, Kosovo Serbs, and Kosovo Serb IDPs, “strongly agree” that they would protest an unfair agreement, and another one-quarter to one-third “agree” that they would. Similar percentages among these three groups are also willing to join in support to a fair agreement, provided that other members of their ethnic group are also supportive. The findings suggest that, depending on the perception of fairness/unfairness of the outcome, reasonable majorities of all groups except Serbia Serbs are likely to become involved in active displays of either support or opposition. In addition, significant percentages of Kosovo Albanians, Kosovo Serbs, and Kosovo Serb IDPs are likely to express their views in the electoral arena, with between 40 and 60% reporting they “strongly agree” or “agree” that they would vote against political parties that “spoiled” a negotiated settlement.

Similar to the “intra-Serb” group differences discovered on negotiations issues, Serbia Serbs differ considerably from Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Serb IDPs by having a much less intense behavioral readiness to either protest or support a Kosovo future status agreement. While 50% of Serbia Serbs would protest an unfair agreement and 60% would support a fair agreement along with others in their ethnic group (substantial percentages), these percentages are low compared to percentages of about 80-85% for these items among Kosovo Serb IDPs and Kosovo Serbs.

Another way to summarize overall behavioral tendencies is to simply count the number of times individual respondents “strongly agree” or “agree” (affirmative response) that they would undertake the four protest/support behaviors mentioned above. We can heuristically label individuals as “activists” if they answer affirmatively to three of these behaviors. Table 4.3 below shows the percentages of “activist” respondents within each of the four groups.

| <b>Kosovo Albanians</b> | <b>Kosovo Serbs</b> | <b>Kosovo Serb IDPs</b> | <b>Serbia Serbs</b> |
|-------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|
| <b>68%</b>              | <b>43%</b>          | <b>60%</b>              | <b>42%</b>          |

As can be seen, the percentage of potential activists

is highest, among Kosovo Albanians, lowest for Serbia Serbs and Kosovo Serbs, and in the middle range for Kosovo Serb IDPs. In general, the table suggests a relatively high degree of behavioral readiness among all of the groups, especially among Kosovo Albanians.

Last, we can focus again on the “no compromisers” in the four groups (see Figure 4.3) – respondents in each group who are unwilling to tolerate both the other side’s preferences on both the “core” future status issue and technical issues—to see how “activist” a category of individuals they are: that is, how likely is it that they will protest unfair agreements or support settlements with which they agree. To do this analysis, we first divided individuals by whether or not they are in the “No Compromise” group, and then we cross-classified whether they are “activist” or not in their behavioral readiness. This analysis shows that the vast majority of “no compromisers” in all four groups is behaviorally engaged. For example, three quarters of the Kosovo Albanian “No Compromisers” are also activists, and this figure ranges from 60% to 83% for the Serb groups. This finding indicates there is a “hard core” of “no compromisers” within each group is very likely to protest an Kosovo future status agreement that they perceive as unfair, or support a perceived fair agreement. The analysis also yields a four-fold typology of compromise and behavioral engagement with “compromise-activists,” “compromise-passives,” “no compromise activists” and “no compromise passives.” The percentages of each type for the four main groups are shown in Figure 4.5, which presents an overall landscape more favorable to potential compromise. First, the number of compromisers is larger than the “no compromisers” in every group, and there is a sizeable number of “compromise-activists” in most groups. Forty-five percent of Kosovo Albanians are classified as “compromise-activists,” and this figure reaches 30-32% for Serbia Serbs and Kosovo Serb IDPs. This indicates that there is a larger potential for mobilizing behavioral support for compromise agreements than to mobilize behavioral opposition to agreements that a given ethnic group perceives as unfair.




Figure 4.5: Typology of Compromise and Behavioral Engagement

Second, in keeping with the results presented thus far, the behavioral tendencies of Serbia Serbs are considerably less intense than the three other groups. Sixty percent of Serbia Serbs are classified as “passive,” with most of these individuals falling into the “compromise – passive” type (i.e., favoring some form of compromise on either the “core” or technical issues). Only 10% of Serbia Serbs are classified as “No-Compromise-Activists,” well less than half the figures seen in the other three groups.

## SECTION FIVE: PERSUASION FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT

In this section, we report on the results of two different kinds of “persuasion” questions asked in the KAP survey. First, “bundles” questions attempt to mobilize public support for Future Status Agreement packages that combine one status proposal with different “technical issue” proposals to see if significant segments of Kosovo Albanians or Serbs are moved to support a package that contains some of what they like along with some of what the other side prefers. Second, “counterargument” questions aim to move public opinion on one important technical issue, namely decentralization, by presenting respondents with various arguments aimed at leading individuals to think about the issue differently and perhaps come to a changed position.

### A. Future Status Agreement Bundles

Some time after asking the respondent’s opinions on all the future status and technical issue proposals (those examined in Section 4 above), respondents in the KAP survey were presented with three different Kosovo Future Status Agreement “bundles” created by the survey research team. Due to technical reasons (i.e., the length of the questionnaire, ability of respondents to retain information), the bundles contain a limited number of technical issues. The response options for the bundles were the same as those for the individual status and technical issue proposals discussed in Section 4: (1) Essential, (2) Desirable, (3) Tolerable, or (4) Unacceptable for a Future Status Agreement.

#### 1. Full Independence with Three Serb-Oriented Technical Issue Proposals

The first “bundle” or package was designed explicitly with the understanding that, in order to “move” Serb respondents toward accepting Kosovo independence, the package would likely need to contain multiple technical issue proposals that Serb respondents were already disposed to favor. This first bundle provided for the following:

- a) The powers of municipal governments in Serb-majority areas would be increased more so than in other regions;
- b) Kosovo Serbs would have the right to double citizenship and to guaranteed representation in Kosovo's governing institutions
- c) Kosovo would be a fully independent state within its present borders

The key persuasion questions for this bundle are: (1) Does the inclusion of three Serb-oriented technical issue proposals increase the likelihood that Serb




Figure 5.1a: Responses to Full Independence Bundled with Three Technical Issues

respondents will accept “full independence” for Kosovo?; and (2) Does the inclusion of the most preferred Kosovo Albanian proposal on the core future status issue increase the likelihood that Albanian respondents will accept the relatively undesirable proposals for technical issues?

To the extent that the answer to both of these questions is “yes,” then the bundle can be said to be potentially persuasive in moving the two sides towards a compromise settlement.

These questions may be answered, in the first instance, by comparing the percentage of respondents in each group who initially found full Kosovo independence at least “tolerable” (i.e., gave response options 1, 2 or 3 to the status proposal when considered separately) with the percentage who found this outcome within a bundle at least ‘tolerable’. In the second instance, we may compare the percentage of Kosovo Albanian respondents who initially found the bundle’s three technical issues at least “tolerable,” with the percentage who are willing to at least tolerate a bundle that combines these proposals with their group’s preferred outcome of Kosovo full independence. We show the results of these analyses in Figures 5.1-and 5.1-b.

As shown in Figure 5.1-a, the movement of Serb respondents in response to the first “bundle” is limited, with some variation across the three Serb groups. Among Kosovo Serbs, the overall movement is less than 5%, meaning the “offer” of three relatively desirable technical issue proposals is not sufficient to lead to the acceptance of full Kosovo independence. The movement among Kosovo Serb IDPs is somewhat bigger at about 10%, and greater still among Serbia Serbs at 11%, with a full 37% of Serbia Serbs willing to at least tolerate full independence for Kosovo provided that the three technical proposals are included in the package. These results are mixed in terms of their implications for the negotiations process: Kosovo Serbs appear to be the least likely to respond to bundles that contain full independence, while there is much more willingness on the part of Serbia Serbs to tolerate this outcome in a negotiations bundle.

Kosovo Albanians also respond in mixed fashion to this first bundle. The dual citizenship for Kosovo Serbs proposal is tolerated by 60% of Kosovo Albanians initially, but this figure rises to 73% of Kosovo Albanians when the proposal is part of the first bundle. The proposal for guaranteed representation of minority communities in Kosovo’s governing institutions is *less* popular as part of the bundle than when it is considered separately. Perhaps this bundle’s most optimistic results concern the decentralization proposal to increase the powers of municipal governments in Serb-majority areas of Kosovo more so than in other regions. While only 36% of Kosovo Albanians find this decentralization issue proposal “tolerable” when considered separately, 73% accept it when it is included as part of this first package containing full independence for Kosovo. Thus, Kosovo Albanians are willing to tolerate even relatively disliked technical issue outcomes provided they are bundled with the highly desirable status outcome of full independence.




Figure 5.1b: Kosovo Albanian Responses to Technical Issues When Bundled with Full Independence





Figure 5.2a: Responses to Kosovo Remaining in Serbia When Considered Separately and When Part of a Bundle

## 2. Kosovo Remaining in Serbia Combined with Two Kosovo Albanian-Oriented Technical Issues

The second bundle attempted to accomplish the reverse of the first one: that is, it examined whether a package containing several Albanian-oriented technical issues would be sufficient to move Kosovo Albanians towards a future status outcome that would leave Kosovo as a province in Serbia, and to move Serbs towards accepting relatively undesirable technical issue outcomes. The second Future Status Agreement bundle provided for the following:

- There would be an international guarantee of Kosovo’s status, one that Serbia could not challenge,
- Mitrovica would be one city with two districts having equal and extensive powers  
IN RETURN FOR WHICH
- Kosovo would remain inside Serbia as one province with very wide autonomy



This bundle “offers” Kosovo Albanian respondents a Mitrovica issue outcome advanced by the Kosovo Negotiating Team in the Vienna talks, and provides for an international guarantee of the wide autonomy Kosovo would have as a province within Serbia. The analytic questions are whether Kosovo Albanians accept this future status outcome as part of a bundle with

Figure 5.2b: Serb Responses to Technical Issues When Bundled with Keeping Kosovo in Serbia

these technical issue proposals, and whether Serbs would accept these Mitrovica and international guarantee proposals as part of a bundle where Kosovo would remain in Serbia. The results are shown in Figures 5.2a and 5.2b.

Figure 5.2a shows there is reasonable movement of about 14% of Kosovo Albanians who initially would not tolerate a future status outcome of remaining in Serbia to at least “tolerating” this outcome, as part of a package with Kosovo Albanian-oriented technical issue outcomes. The result is just under one-quarter of Kosovo Albanian respondents willing to tolerate the overall package. While this is of course still a small portion of that group, it does show the potential for certain Kosovo Albanian-oriented technical issue proposals to move some Kosovo Albanians toward a more Serb-oriented outcome on the “core” future status issue.


In Figure 5.2b, we see that the second bundle is “tolerated” by over 90% of each of the three Serb groups, indicating Serbs are willing to accept some less desirable technical issue outcomes in exchange for the “core” outcome of keeping Kosovo in Serbia. For example, while only 28.5% of Kosovo Serbs tolerate an international guarantee of Kosovo’s status when considered separately, this figure rises to 91% when bundled with a “core” future status outcome favored by Serbs. There is even a 15-20% greater likelihood of Serbs accepting Mitrovica as one city when this proposal is presented as part of this bundle, though the outcome was tolerated by many Serbs in the first place as a separate proposal.

### 3. “Conditional” Independence Combined with Several Consensual Technical Issues

The final bundle was designed to gauge whether both Kosovo Albanian and Serb respondents would move toward “conditional” independence for Kosovo, which both Kosovo Albanian and Serb respondents view as unpopular as a separate proposal, by bundling it with two technical issue proposals that nearly all groups found at least “desirable” when considered separately. This last bundle provided for the following:

- a) an international civil and military presence to guarantee democracy and the security and freedom of movement of all people in Kosovo;
  - b) the Government of Serbia would return to individuals in Kosovo the savings and pensions they invested in state banks and other state institutions before 1989
- IN RETURN FOR WHICH
- c) Kosovo would be “conditionally independent” within its present borders; that is, an independent state but without things like a separate army and memberships in international organizations until after a fixed period of adjustment

We are interested here in the extent to which all groups will move towards acceptance of a “conditional independence”



future status outcome within an overall package that contains the two consensual technical issues. The results are shown in Figure 5.3.

It can be seen that the bundle was most successful in moving

Figure 5.3: Responses to Conditional Independence in a Bundle

Kosovo Albanians to at least tolerate a future status outcome of conditional independence. While 33.1% of Kosovo Albanians tolerate this outcome when considered separately (i.e., because the overwhelming majority of Kosovo Albanians prefer full independence), 52% of this group tolerates conditional independence when bundled with several desirable technical issues. On the other hand, these technical issues are not sufficient to move Serbs towards tolerating the “core” outcome of conditional independence. Only a 4-7% difference exists in each of the Serb groups between their initial position on conditional independence and their bundled position on this future status outcome, which indicates much more would need to be “offered” to these groups to have them tolerate this future status outcome. Still, it should be noted that this bundle does result in majorities of both Serbia Serbs and Kosovo Albanians who are willing to tolerate the conditional independence outcome.

We can draw several general conclusions from this section’s analysis of the “persuasion” effects of three Future Status Agreement bundles:

- It is relatively easy to generate acceptance of a wide variety of technical issue proposals, provided they are bundled with a status outcome that a given group favors.
- Movement by both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs toward tolerating the “extreme” future status outcome of the other side was limited, but with some variation. While there was only about a 5% movement among Kosovo Serbs, bundles produced an 11-14 net percentage point change for both Kosovo Albanians and Serbia Serbs in terms of “tolerating” the other side’s core future status demand.
- Kosovo Albanians appear open to at least tolerating a “conditional independence” status outcome if it is bundled with attractive technical issues outcomes, but the technical issue outcomes offered in our third bundle were not sufficient to change the position of many Serbs on the “conditional independence” outcome.

## **B. Counterarguments to Attempt to Change Opinions on Decentralization**

The KAP survey also included an analysis of whether different arguments presented to respondents may cause opinions to change for one important technical issue proposal: a decentralisation proposal in which the powers of municipal governments in Serb-majority areas of Kosovo would be increased more so than in other regions. Decentralization was one the main issues discussed in the Vienna talks between the Kosovo Albanian and Serbian delegations when the survey was conducted. To test the extent to which public opinion on decentralization may change in the face of particular counter-arguments, KAPS asked the following:

“There has been a lot of talk about different kinds of “decentralisation”—that is, ways of dividing power between the central government and municipal governments in Kosovo. Some people think that kind of decentralisation in which the powers of municipal governments in Serb-majority areas of Kosovo are increased more so than in other regions is necessary for any future status agreement. Others disagree. How about you? Do you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree that this kind of decentralization is necessary to any agreement on Kosovo’s future status?”

Respondents who either “strongly agree” or “agree” with the need for this asymmetric type of decentralization are the “pro” group, and those who are neutral, “disagree,” or “strongly disagree” with the need are the “anti” decentralization group. These respondents were then asked a randomly selected counterargument question designed to persuade them to change their “pro” or “anti” views about this type of decentralization.

**Counterarguments for “Pro” Decentralization Group:**

- 1) Would your opinion be different if you knew that this kind of decentralisation might lead to more ethnic segregation in Kosovo?
- 2) Would your opinion be different if you knew that this kind of decentralisation might lead to the government of Serbia having more say in Serb municipalities in Kosovo?

**Counterarguments for “Anti” Decentralization Group:**

- 1) Would your opinion be different if you knew that many people think that this kind of decentralisation is the best way to ensure the personal safety and the rights of Serbs in Kosovo?
- 2) Would your opinion be different if you knew that this kind of decentralisation has been used in some other multi-ethnic countries that eventually joined the European Union?

We designed these arguments to mimic at least some of the important arguments circulating about the asymmetric form of decentralization studied in this part of the KAP survey. For those who favor this type of decentralization, arguments against it that may be persuasive are those highlighting the possibility of more ethnic segregation and isolation in Kosovo, and (for Kosovo Albanian respondents) the possibility that the Government of Serbia might have more influence in Serb-majority municipalities. For those opposed to this type of decentralization, arguments in favor of it that may be persuasive highlight decentralization’s utility in ensuring Serb safety and minority rights in Kosovo, and in facilitating the eventual membership of Kosovo into the European Union.

Public opinion on the “baseline” question of whether “*this kind decentralization is necessary to any agreement on Kosovo’s future status?*” varies significantly across Serbs and Kosovo Albanians: between 60 and 67% of the three Serb groups answer in the affirmative, while nearly three-quarters (71.9%) of Kosovo Albanians disagree. Nevertheless, there are sufficient numbers on both sides of the decentralization issue in all four groups to test the effectiveness of different counterarguments.




Figure 5.4: Opinion Change from Counterarguments Regarding Decentralization

The counterargument results are reported in Figure 5.4, where the top two bars for each ethnic group are the percentage of those *initially opposed* who report their opinion would be different in response to the “pro” arguments, and the bottom two bars for each group are the percentage of those *initially in favor* who report

their opinion would change in response to the “anti” arguments. These results do not tell us how much the opinions of respondents would change, only that some change is self-reported as likely to occur. Looking more closely at Figure 5.4, we see that opinions on the decentralization issue are generally open to change. The fact that large numbers of respondents seem to respond to the counterarguments indicates that the decentralization issue has not yet “crystallized” among many individuals in all groups. This means there is room, in general, for political actors, elites, and other opinion leaders to attempt to shape public opinion on decentralization within all four groups studied here. Second, Figure 5.4 suggests there is some tendency for individuals to be more susceptible to arguments that push them in the direction of their ethnic group’s (Kosovo Albanian and Serb) general predisposition on the decentralization issue: that is, Serb respondents generally appear slightly more open to arguments *in favor* of decentralization, while Albanian respondents are most receptive to one particular argument (ethnic segregation) *against* decentralization. These tendencies are only slight ones, and thus it is still the case that Kosovo Albanian and Serb respondents are open to persuasion on *both* sides of the decentralization issue.

Third, the figure shows that there are some differences in the strength of the arguments on each side of the decentralization issue across the four groups. This suggests that efforts to mobilize support for a decentralization policy would be most successful by crafting targeted appeals to the different ethnic groups: Serb *and* Albanian groups all appear to respond to the potential benefits to Kosovo and Serbia in the form of EU membership, while Serbs also respond naturally to appeals to their ethnic group’s safety within Kosovo and the protection of Serb rights. Also, there is one counter-argument *against* decentralization – the potential for increased ethnic isolation and segregation within Kosovo – that resonates strongly among Kosovo Albanians as well as large segments of the Serb groups.

## SECTION SIX: THE VIEWS OF OTHER GROUPS WITHIN KOSOVO AND SERBIA

While the KAP survey’s main emphasis is on the four groups analyzed thus far, the survey also gathered important information concerning the attitudes, opinions and behavioral intentions of minority communities within Kosovo and Serbia (i.e., Kosovo Others and Serbia Others). The representative probability sample of predominantly Albanian-populated areas of Kosovo yielded 98 non-Albanian respondents, and a similar number of non-Serbs (106) were interviewed in the representative probability sample of Serbia. We supplemented these samples with a “booster” sample of 202 Kosovo minority respondents, drawn by randomly selecting twenty one primary sampling units from all areas where sufficient numbers of Turks, Bosniaks, Roma, and Gorani reside and then interviewing 9-10 individuals within those areas. In this way we ensured that the minority groups in our Kosovo sample were drawn from both Albanian and Serb areas and consisted of groups oriented toward both of the ‘dominant’ ethnic communities.




Figure 6.1: Public Opinion of Other Community Minorities on Future Status Proposals

The samples are relatively small and not completely random, and thus the results reported in this section are not as scientifically robust as those reported in previous sections. Nevertheless, we have a reasonable number of individuals in three general groups, and their responses can be compared for illustrative purposes:

- 1) Kosovo minorities oriented towards Albanians (Turks, Ashkali, Egyptians, Bosniaks)
- 2) Kosovo minorities oriented towards Serbs (Roma and Gorani)
- 3) Serbia minorities (mainly Croats, Bosniaks, and “others”)

We present the distribution of each of these groups on several of the more important orientations analyzed in the study thus far – opinions on the “core” future status of Kosovo, the typologies presented earlier regarding individuals’ willingness to compromise on “core” and “technical issues,” and the extent to which individuals will be likely to actively oppose (or support) a negotiated settlement that they perceive as unfair (or fair). Figure 6.1 shows the distribution of each of these groups’ opinions on the four core status issues – full and “conditional” independence, and the two options for Kosovo to remain in Serbia with varying degrees of autonomy.

The results indicate that the opinions of the minority communities are similar to those seen for their corresponding “dominant” groups in section 4, but with a marked decline in the “intensity” or “extremity” of the views. That is, individuals in Kosovo from minority groups oriented toward Albanians report full independence is “essential” at a level of 57% compared to the nearly 90% figure registered for Kosovo Albanians in Figure 4.1. Similarly, Serb-oriented minorities in Kosovo find full independence unacceptable “only” at the level of 69% compared to the above 90% figure for Kosovo Serbs. And about half of the minority sample in Serbia finds full independence unacceptable, compared to some 74% of Serbian Serbs. This same pattern is evident in each of the other future status items – the divergence of views between the minority groups is much less intense than the strong divergence of views between the majority Albanian and Serb groups.

Such results suggest that minority groups will be more “open” to the other side’s position on the future status issue, and this is exactly what our analysis finds. A majority (56%) of individuals in Kosovo minority groups oriented towards Albanians show an openness to at least tolerate the other side’s preferred status outcome or to not say their group’s preferred status outcome is “essential,” as do over 90% of individuals in Kosovo minority groups oriented toward Serbs and 73% of individuals in minority groups in Serbia. These figures are all significantly larger than the corresponding percentages of the “dominant” majority groups in Table 4.1.

Opinion on technical issues is also generally flexible within the various minority communities. To be sure, minority groups feel strongly about certain issues, for example, that minorities should have representation in Kosovo governing institutions and that displaced persons should be able to return to their homes and property. But on most issues, large numbers of minority respondents register responses that are not at the extremes. This can be seen by calculating the proportion of each group that are “open to compromise” on technical issue proposals according to the scoring criteria discussed in Section 4. Over 85% of Kosovo minorities oriented toward Albanians are found to be “open” according to these criteria, along with two-thirds of Serb-oriented minorities in Kosovo and individuals from minority groups in Serbia. The figures for the Kosovo minority groups (Kosovo Others) are both significantly larger than were seen for Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs in Table 4.2.

Figure 6.2 displays the typology of compromise types within each of the three groups of




Figure 6.2: Compromisers among Other Community Minorities (percentage)

minority respondents. As can be seen, “full compromisers” (i.e., those who are open on both “core” status and “technical” issues) constitute a majority of each of the three groups. Another one-third of minorities oriented toward Albanians are willing to compromise on the technical issues but not the core, while one-third of minorities oriented toward Serbs in Kosovo are willing to compromise on core but not on a majority of the technical issues. There are very small percentages of “no compromisers” in each of the groups, with the 17% figure among minorities in Serbia being the largest value. The pattern of results here is very clear, with each of the minority groupings taking less extreme stands than was seen for their corresponding “dominant” groups in section 4.

Finally, this diminished intensity of views also extends into the realm of behavioral intentions. While more than 40% of respondents from the four main groups studied in Section 4 “strongly agree” that they would protest an agreement that was perceived as unfair, no more than 23% of any of the minority community groups register this response. Overall, the percentage of potential “activist” or behaviorally engaged respondents (i.e., those who answered affirmatively to three of the four protest/support behavior statements) is relatively small for Serb Others at 27% and Albanian-oriented Kosovo Others at 39%, figures considerably lower than those of their corresponding “dominant” group in Table 4.4. The potential for activist behavior among Serb-oriented Kosovo Others is much larger at 57%. However, even among the comparatively few “hardcore” non-compromisers in these three minority groupings, less than half are protest oriented, such that the overall percentage of “hard core activists” is a mere 4% of minority respondents aligned with Kosovo Albanians, 6% among minority respondents in Serbia, with no respondents at all in the hard core activist group among the Serb-oriented minorities in Kosovo.