

Supporting Information

*Civic Education, Political Discussion and the Social Transmission of Democratic Knowledge and Values
in a New Democracy: Kenya 2002*

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This document provides:

- 1) The full results for tables 4 and 5, which were truncated in the main text to save space;
- 2) The results of models discussed in footnote 7, estimated as further robustness checks for potential biases that may result from respondents' self-reported exposure to civic education activities;
- 3) The results of the models discussed in footnotes 9 and 13, estimated as further robustness checks for potential selection biases that may result from observable differences between workshop attendees and non-attendees; and
- 4) A brief summation of all of the methods we have employed in the paper to control for potential selection effects, or biases due to pre-existing differences between (self-selected) civic education workshop attendees and the control group.

1) Full Results for Tables 4 and 5 from Main Text

Full Table 4 (from Text). Two-Wave Fixed Effect and Three-Wave Trend Models: The Effects of Civic Education and Discussion on Democratic Orientations

	Political knowledge		Participation		Tolerance		National v. tribal identification	
	Two-Wave Fixed Effects	Three-Wave Differential Trends	Two-Wave Fixed Effects	Three-Wave Differential Trends	Two-Wave Fixed Effects	Three-Wave Differential Trends	Two-Wave Fixed Effects	Three-Wave Differential Trends
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
Total workshops	0.093** (0.022)	0.063** (0.016)	0.086* (0.037)	0.081* (0.032)	0.101** (0.026)	-0.013 (0.021)	0.054** (0.018)	0.051** (0.02)
Discuss others	0.066** (0.023)	0.113** (0.014)	0.050 (0.040)	0.039 (0.028)	0.069** (0.026)	0.095** (0.019)	0.042* (0.018)	0.065** (0.01)
Media consumption	0.494** (0.084)	1.306** (0.062)	0.427** (0.148)	0.549** (0.106)	0.204* (0.094)	0.425** (0.072)	0.073 (0.062)	0.140** (0.05)
Political interest	0.048 (0.081)	0.080 (0.062)	0.505** (0.138)	0.624** (0.100)	0.036 (0.089)	-0.068 (0.066)	-0.068 (0.063)	-0.097* (0.04)
Group memberships	0.408** (0.106)	0.540** (0.069)	2.947** (0.187)	3.217** (0.123)	0.068 (0.110)	0.011 (0.077)	-0.203** (0.078)	-0.355** (0.05)
General political discussion	0.092** (0.028)	0.205** (0.023)	0.184** (0.045)	0.262** (0.034)	0.030 (0.032)	0.060** (0.022)	0.056** (0.021)	0.057** (0.01)
December reinterview	0.265** (0.043)		-0.730** (0.073)		-0.288** (0.049)		0.088** (0.032)	
March-April reinterview	-0.041 (0.059)		-0.568** (0.105)		-0.287** (0.066)		0.086* (0.041)	
Treatment group		-0.035 (0.042)		0.146* (0.063)		-0.026 (0.042)		0.056* (0.03)
Time trend		-0.025 (0.028)		-0.322** (0.047)		-0.164** (0.032)		0.051** (0.02)
Trend X treatment group		0.092** (0.035)		-0.038 (0.062)		0.087* (0.041)		0.017 (0.03)
Constant	1.605** (0.080)	0.951** (0.064)	0.826** (0.136)	0.226* (0.092)	1.754** (0.090)	1.676** (0.062)	0.189** (0.063)	0.196** (0.043)
R-squared	0.185	0.222	0.167	0.222	0.024	0.024	0.071	0.061
Number of observations	4593	4993	4593	4993	4586	4983	4583	4983
Number of groups	2301	2301	2301	2301	2301	2301	2301	2301

Note: Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients are significant at #p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. R-squared within is presented for 2-wave fixed effect models.

Full Table 5 (from Text). Fixed Effect Models: The Interaction of Resources and Motivation with Discussion

	Civic education interactions				Discussion interactions			
	Knowledge	Participation	Tolerance	Identity	Knowledge	Participation	Tolerance	Identity
Civic education exposure	0.186** (0.049)	0.131 (0.088)	0.053 (0.061)	0.061 (0.042)	0.099** (0.022)	0.085* (0.037)	0.102** (0.026)	0.063** (0.018)
Discuss others	0.070** (0.023)	0.049 (0.040)	0.073** (0.026)	0.047** (0.018)	0.169** (0.049)	0.055 (0.089)	0.006 (0.058)	0.106** (0.038)
Interactions with:								
Group memberships	-0.070 (0.071)	0.085 (0.139)	-0.010 (0.096)	-0.138* (0.060)	-0.131+ (0.069)	0.049 (0.136)	0.068 (0.088)	-0.223** (0.059)
Education	-0.225** (0.074)	-0.182 (0.132)	-0.135 (0.089)	-0.009 (0.062)	-0.212** (0.072)	-0.131 (0.132)	-0.140+ (0.082)	-0.020 (0.058)
Rural	0.024 (0.030)	-0.024 (0.055)	0.152** (0.037)	0.081** (0.026)	0.039 (0.029)	0.033 (0.054)	0.125** (0.034)	0.048* (0.024)
Political interest	0.038 (0.081)	0.502** (0.138)	0.025 (0.089)	-0.075 (0.063)	0.047 (0.081)	0.508** (0.138)	0.045 (0.089)	-0.071 (0.063)
Media consumption	0.536** (0.085)	0.451** (0.149)	0.252** (0.095)	0.090 (0.061)	0.531** (0.085)	0.454** (0.149)	0.248** (0.095)	0.080 (0.061)
General political discussion	0.082** (0.028)	0.182** (0.045)	0.020 (0.032)	0.048* (0.021)	0.079** (0.028)	0.180** (0.045)	0.023 (0.032)	0.046* (0.021)
Group memberships	0.371** (0.115)	2.997** (0.204)	0.079 (0.121)	-0.277** (0.082)	0.318** (0.118)	2.977** (0.206)	0.105 (0.125)	-0.352** (0.086)
December reinterview	0.263** (0.042)	-0.727** (0.073)	-0.293** (0.048)	0.082* (0.032)	0.264** (0.042)	-0.726** (0.073)	-0.285** (0.049)	0.080* (0.032)
March-April reinterview	-0.052 (0.059)	-0.567** (0.105)	-0.305** (0.066)	0.072+ (0.041)	-0.059 (0.059)	-0.575** (0.105)	-0.301** (0.066)	0.071+ (0.041)
Constant	1.617** (0.083)	0.798** (0.141)	1.747** (0.092)	0.224** (0.064)	1.638** (0.083)	0.803** (0.141)	1.719** (0.094)	0.257** (0.066)
R-squared within	0.189	0.168	0.034	0.034	0.191	0.168	0.032	0.079
Number of observations	4593	4593	4586	4583	4593	4593	4586	4583

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on 2,301 respondents. Coefficients are significant at +p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01.

2) Supporting Information for Footnote 7

These models were estimated as further controls for possible biases that may have resulted from respondents' *self-reported* (versus independently measured) exposure to civic education activities. As discussed in the main text, we could objectively verify the exposure of respondents to civic education activities only for the initial wave 1 workshop attendee group, as their interviews were conducted when they entered the workshop site. In Table SI-1, we show that the results are nearly identical if individuals in the initial non-attendee group who subsequently *reported* attending a civic education activity in their wave 2 interview are excluded from the analysis. In Table SI-2, we show significant effects on all dependent variables aside from political participation from a dichotomized treatment variable that ignores the self-reported exposures to *additional* civic education activities for the initial workshop attendees. Figure 1 in the main text, however, shows that this dichotomous treatment variable is significant even for political participation in workshops that were conducted using active, participatory teaching methodologies. These results provide additional confidence that the findings reported in the main text are not artifacts of self-reported civic education exposure.

Table SI-1. Two-Wave Fixed Effect and Three-Wave Differential Trend Models Excluding Initial Non-Attendees Who Self-Reported Treatment

	Political knowledge		Participation		Tolerance		National v. tribal identification	
	Two-Wave Fixed Effects	Three-Wave Differential Trends	Two-Wave Fixed Effects	Three-Wave Differential Trends	Two-Wave Fixed Effects	Three-Wave Differential Trends	Two-Wave Fixed Effects	Three-Wave Differential Trends
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
Total workshops	0.110** (0.02)	0.102** (0.02)	0.073+ (0.04)	0.101** (0.03)	0.103** (0.03)	0.007 (0.02)	0.069** (0.02)	0.080** (0.02)
Media consumption	0.534** (0.09)	1.301** (0.07)	0.552** (0.16)	0.572** (0.11)	0.229* (0.10)	0.465** (0.07)	0.104 (0.07)	0.156** (0.05)
Political interest	-0.030 (0.09)	0.092 (0.06)	0.514** (0.15)	0.627** (0.10)	0.046 (0.10)	-0.083 (0.07)	-0.076 (0.07)	-0.091* (0.04)
Group memberships	0.448** (0.11)	0.574** (0.07)	2.863** (0.20)	3.164** (0.13)	0.093 (0.12)	0.059 (0.08)	-0.186* (0.08)	-0.291** (0.05)
General political discussion	0.091** (0.03)	0.204** (0.02)	0.203** (0.05)	0.263** (0.04)	-0.003 (0.03)	0.059** (0.02)	0.053* (0.02)	0.053** (0.02)
December reinterview	0.312** (0.04)		-0.689** (0.07)		-0.220** (0.04)		0.114** (0.03)	
March-April reinterview	0.020 (0.06)		-0.499** (0.10)		-0.185** (0.07)		0.116** (0.04)	
Treatment group		-0.052 (0.04)		0.171** (0.06)		-0.036 (0.04)		0.044+ (0.03)
Time trend		0.025 (0.03)		-0.304** (0.05)		-0.120** (0.03)		0.080** (0.02)
Trend X treatment group		0.111** (0.04)		-0.055 (0.06)		0.116** (0.04)		0.021 (0.03)
Constant	1.629** (0.09)	0.947** (0.07)	0.753** (0.15)	0.231* (0.09)	1.776** (0.10)	1.660** (0.06)	0.174* (0.07)	0.173** (0.04)
No. of observations	4266	4644	4266	4644	4259	4634	4256	4634
No. of groups	2300	2300	2300	2300	2300	2300	2300	2300
R-squared	0.157	0.197	0.170	0.221	0.017	0.017	0.062	0.051

Note: Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients are significant at #p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. R-sq within is presented for 2-wave fixed effect models.

Table SI-2. Two-Wave Fixed Effect Models Using a Dichotomous Treatment Indicator and Excluding Initial Non-Attendees Who Self-Reported Treatment

	Political knowledge	Participation	Tolerance	National v. tribal identification
Initial workshop attendee	0.292** (0.05)	0.086 (0.09)	0.203** (0.06)	0.086* (0.04)
Media consumption	0.562** (0.09)	0.574** (0.16)	0.258* (0.10)	0.125+ (0.07)
Political interest	-0.020 (0.09)	0.508** (0.15)	0.047 (0.10)	-0.082 (0.07)
Group memberships	0.467** (0.11)	2.863** (0.20)	0.103 (0.12)	-0.184* (0.08)
General political discussion	0.087** (0.03)	0.200** (0.05)	-0.007 (0.03)	0.050* (0.02)
December reinterview	0.253** (0.05)	-0.664** (0.08)	-0.233** (0.05)	0.136** (0.03)
March-April reinterview	-0.036 (0.06)	-0.473** (0.11)	-0.196** (0.07)	0.138** (0.04)
Constant	1.604** (0.09)	0.750** (0.15)	1.762** (0.10)	0.170* (0.07)
No. of observations	4266	4266	4259	4256
No. of groups	2300	2300	2300	2300
R-squared within	0.159	0.168	0.014	0.056

Note: Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients are significant at #p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.

3) Supporting Information for Footnotes 9 and 13

These models were estimated as further controls for possible selection biases due to observable differences between the self-selected workshop attendees and non-attendees. The panel models estimated in the main text control for these potential biases in several ways: via differencing procedures that eliminate *stable* observables from consideration, and by including additional time-varying observables as controls in the fixed effects regression models. As discussed in the main text, panel models have additional benefits as well, in that they also control (via the differencing process) for stable *unobservable* factors such as personality, intrinsic motivation and the like that may be related to both workshop participation and the dependent variables. And in the three-wave case, they also allow for the estimation of models that control for possible differential time trends on the dependent variables between the workshop attendees and the control group, such that attendees may already have been changing on the democratic orientations at a faster rate and would thus have registered higher values on the dependent variables even in the (counterfactual) absence of civic education exposure.

Alternative, matching-based procedures focus more explicitly on controlling for possible selection biases due to observable factors that differ for the treatment and control groups. In the “propensity-score” variant of matching methods, a selection equation is estimated first by regressing treatment status against a series of observed factors in order to generate each individual’s overall “propensity” to receive a treatment. Then, causal effects are estimated by comparing the average level of the dependent variables for individuals in the treatment group to their counterparts in the control group with identical (or nearly identical) propensity scores, based on the observed covariates that had been entered into the selection equation. These differences thus represent the effect of the treatment after equating or “balancing” the treatment

and control group on pre-existing observed factors that may be associated with both an individual's (self-selected) treatment status and the dependent variables.

As additional robustness checks to the models estimated in the main text, we estimated propensity-score matching models following the procedures outlined for “multiple treatments” in Imai and van Dyk (2004) and Yanovitsky *et al.* (2004). In our case, multiple treatment methods were necessary, as individuals were exposed to varying levels of civic education and to varying levels of post-civic education discussion. We first estimated ordinal logistic regression models predicting the individual's wave 2 levels of *Civic education exposure* and *Discuss others* with group memberships, political interest, media exposure, general political discussion, education, age, gender, rural/urban location and frequency of church attendance, all measured at wave 1. The results of the estimation of these “selection equations” are shown in Tables SI-3 and SI-4 below.

Table SI-3. Ordered logit model: Predictors of the Number of Workshops Reported, Wave 2

	Coefficient	Standard error
Media consumption (wave 1)	.364*	0.181
Political interest (wave 1)	0.737***	0.149
Group memberships (wave 1)	1.472*	0.207
General political discussion (wave 1)	0.150**	0.054
Male	-0.081	0.084
Rural resident	-0.271**	0.088
Education	-0.025	0.027
Church attendee	0.155***	0.043
Age	0.005	0.003
<i>Cutpoint 1</i>	<i>1.369</i>	<i>0.278</i>
<i>Cutpoint 2</i>	<i>3.026</i>	<i>0.284</i>
<i>Cutpoint 3</i>	<i>3.675</i>	<i>0.287</i>
<i>Cutpoint 4</i>	<i>4.626</i>	<i>0.294</i>
<i>Number of observations</i>	<i>2301</i>	
<i>Pseudo R-squared</i>	<i>0.028</i>	
<i>Log likelihood</i>	<i>-3118.764</i>	

Note: Coefficients are significant at #p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.

Table SI-4. Ordered logit model: Predictors of Discussing Others' Civic Education Experiences, Wave 2

	Coefficient	Standard error
Media consumption (wave 1)	-0.001	0.180
Political interest (wave 1)	0.314*	0.143
Group memberships (wave 1)	0.813***	0.205
General political discussion (wave 1)	0.171**	0.053
Male	0.010	0.082
Rural resident	-0.374***	0.086
Education	0.029	0.026
Church attendee	0.052	0.042
Age	0.003	0.003
<i>Cutpoint 1</i>	<i>0.490</i>	<i>0.273</i>
<i>Cutpoint 2</i>	<i>1.171</i>	<i>0.274</i>
<i>Cutpoint 3</i>	<i>2.209</i>	<i>0.277</i>
<i>Number of observations</i>	<i>2301</i>	
<i>Pseudo R-squared</i>	<i>0.014</i>	
<i>Log likelihood</i>	<i>-3028.188</i>	

Note: Coefficients are significant at #p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.

It can be seen in Table SI-3 that individuals who attended more civic education activities by wave 2 were more politically interested, engaged in more general political discussion, attended more to the mass media and belonged to more secondary associations than individuals who attended fewer or no civic education activities. Individuals exposed to more civic education activities were also likely to be more frequent church-goers and live in urban areas; there was no relationship between civic education attendance and age, education, and sex (three of the variables on which initial attendees and initial non-attendees were matched at the sampling stage). Table SI-4 shows generally similar effects for *Discuss others*, as more post-workshop discussion is associated with higher levels of political interest, discussion, and group memberships, and no relationships with any of the demographic factors aside from urban-rural location.

We then estimated propensity scores—that is, respondents’ propensities to engage in civic education and to discuss others’ civic education experiences, given the observed covariates—as the predicted values from these two logistic regression models. After eliminating the relatively few cases that fell out of the region of common support (i.e., “control” individuals whose propensities were lower than the lowest “treatment” individuals and “treatment” individuals whose propensities were higher than the highest “control” individuals), we divided the sample into four equal strata on the two propensity scores. Following Yanovitsky *et al.* (2004, 214), we then tested for balance on the observed covariates within each propensity score quartile using two-way Analysis of Variance. *Civic education exposure* or *Discuss others* served as one covariate and the propensity score quartile to which the individual was assigned as the other, with each observed covariate as a dependent variable. Table SI-5 shows that, with few minor exceptions, there is no significant remaining imbalance on the observed covariates, once individuals’ propensities for *Civic education exposure* and *Discuss others* are taken into account. In other words, stratifying individuals according to their propensity scores all but eliminates pre-existing differences between the various *Civic education exposure* and *Discuss others* groups on a series of demographic factors, as well as important social and motivational factors such as secondary group memberships, political interest, media exposure, and general political discussion.

SI-5. Balance Before and After Propensity Score Matching: F-Tests and P-values from ANOVA Tests Assessing the Extent to Which the Number of Workshops Explains the Variance in Each Selection Factor

	Without matching	Controlling for propensity score
Group memberships (Wave 1)	15.99 (0.000)	1.04 (0.387)
Political interest (Wave 1)	8.66 (0.000)	2.95 (0.019)
Media consumption (Wave 1)	3.62 (0.006)	0.80 (0.524)
General political discussion (Wave 1)	6.55 (0.000)	1.10 (0.355)
Church attendee	2.91 (0.020)	0.42 (0.794)
Rural resident	4.69 (0.001)	1.64 (0.161)
Education	0.93 (0.444)	0.72 (0.579)
Age	4.84 (0.001)	3.09 (0.015)
Sex	1.42 (0.224)	0.76 (0.554)

Note: P-values for F-statistics are in parentheses.

SI-6. Balance Before and After Propensity Score Matching: F-Tests and P-values from Two-Way ANOVA Tests Assessing the Extent to Which *Discuss Others* Explains Variance in Each Selection Factor

	Without matching	Controlling for propensity score
Group memberships (Wave 1)	13.15 (0.000)	0.90 (0.440)
Political interest (Wave 1)	5.72 (0.001)	1.20 (0.309)
Media consumption (Wave 1)	2.00 (0.112)	0.69 (0.556)
General political discussion (Wave 1)	9.46 (0.000)	0.57 (0.634)
Church attendee	2.10 (0.099)	0.20 (0.898)
Rural resident	6.71 (0.000)	0.63 (0.593)
Education	4.50 (0.004)	1.84 (0.137)
Age	2.40 (0.066)	1.36 (0.254)
Sex	10.67 (0.000)	7.29 (0.000)

Note: P-values for F-statistics are in parentheses.

Finally, we ran separate two-wave difference models within each propensity score stratum, predicting the four democratic dependent variables using first *Civic education exposure*, and then *Discuss others*. These models also included group memberships, media exposure, political interest and general political discussion at each point in time as additional control variables, as in Tables 2 and 4 of the main text. The coefficients and standard errors were then aggregated across strata. The results of these “propensity-score adjusted” estimates of causal effects are shown in Table SI-7. In all of the models, the estimated coefficients are nearly identical to those obtained in Tables 2 and 4 in the main text, and in some cases the magnitude of the estimated effects is larger than that obtained earlier. The only important difference in these

models is that *Civic education exposure*'s effect on political participation drops from .106 in Table 2 to .095 here, with the effect no longer being statistically significant due to a larger estimated standard error. The table thus provides strong evidence that our main conclusions are robust, regardless of whether causal effects are estimated with "standard" fixed effects panel models or with panel models that incorporate propensity-score matching methods to balance the "treatment" and "control" groups explicitly on a series of wave 1 motivational, social, and demographic covariates.

Table SI-7. The Impacts of Civic Education and Discussion on Democratic Orientations, Estimated by Propensity Score Strata

	Stratum 1	Stratum 2	Stratum 3	Stratum 4	Overall	T-statistic (overall)	N (overall)
<i>Knowledge</i>							
CE Workshops	0.144 (0.045)	0.071 (0.045)	0.111 (0.038)	0.148 (0.036)	0.118 (0.041)	2.863	2290
Discuss Others	0.148 (0.042)	0.122 (0.044)	0.116 (0.045)	0.061 (0.041)	0.112 (0.043)	2.599	2295
<i>Participation</i>							
CE Workshops	0.071 (0.080)	0.085 (0.077)	0.127 (0.068)	0.099 (0.071)	0.095 (0.074)	1.291	2291
Discuss Others	0.052 (0.076)	0.113 (0.076)	0.171 (0.082)	-0.002 (0.076)	0.084 (0.078)	1.077	2295
<i>Tolerance</i>							
CE Workshops	0.132 (0.055)	0.188 (0.051)	0.091 (0.044)	0.101 (0.048)	0.128 (0.049)	2.585	2283
Discuss Others	0.134 (0.052)	0.028 (0.052)	0.130 (0.047)	0.139 (0.047)	0.108 (0.049)	2.182	2288
<i>Identity</i>							
CE Workshops	0.068 (0.043)	0.113 (0.036)	0.080 (0.033)	0.049 (0.028)	0.078 (0.035)	2.192	2280
Discuss Others	0.097 (0.039)	0.116 (0.036)	0.041 (0.034)	0.030 (0.032)	0.071 (0.035)	2.025	2285

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients represent results from two-wave first difference models in which each democratic disposition is regressed on either civic education or post-civic education discussion, plus media consumption, political interest, group memberships, general political discussion, and an indicator for time of reinterview. In models estimated using civic education, strata are developed based on the civic education propensity scores; in models estimated using post-civic education discussion, strata are based on the discussion propensity scores. Standard errors for overall model are estimated based on Imai and Van Dyk (2004).

4) Summary of Methods Used to Control for Possible Selection Biases

We have undertaken a series of steps in this paper to control for potential selection biases that may result from the self-selected, non-randomized nature of the civic education and political discussion “treatments” whose causal effects we sought to establish. Specifically:

- At the sampling stage, we matched “treated” individuals -- who were interviewed upon entering a civic education workshop -- with initially untreated individuals living in the same area on the basis of gender, age, and educational attainment. This balanced initial treatment and initial control individuals on important demographic factors that may also be related to democratic orientations;
- We obtained information over time on all respondents via a panel design, so that the models examine differential *change* in the dependent variables between “treated” and “control” individuals. In this way the possibility that workshop attendees (or those who engaged in frequent post-workshop discussions) were already higher on the dependent variables than non-attendees is taken into account in the analysis;
- We used a standard two-wave fixed effects panel data set-up to estimate the effect of civic education exposure and post-civic education political discussion, controlling through the differencing process not only for the prior values of the dependent variable, but also for the effects of any stable *unobservables* that may relate to both selection into the treatment and the dependent variables over time. Given that civic education attendees are likely to have intrinsic personality dispositions or other motivational characteristics that lead them toward more democratic outcomes independent of the treatment itself, this is an important additional advantage of the panel design;

- We included time-varying covariates -- political interest, media attention, general political discussion, and membership in secondary associations --- in the fixed effects models as additional controls, so that differences between treatment and control groups on the dependent variables are estimated holding values of these important social and motivational variables constant at each point in time;
- We have included a third wave of panel observations for some 400 respondents, and used the three-wave data to estimate causal effects while controlling for possible differential time trends on the dependent variables between the workshop attendees and the control group. These models control for possible “selection-maturation” biases, such that attendees may already have been changing on the democratic orientations at a faster rate and would thus have registered higher values on the dependent variables even in the (counterfactual) absence of civic education exposure;
- We have estimated propensity-score matching models that explicitly balanced the treatment and control groups on a series of demographic, social and motivational variables at wave 1, before estimating the causal effects of civic education exposure and post-civic education discussion in fixed effects panel models.

These steps represent a rigorous set of controls for selection biases, in our view the most rigorous yet conducted in the non-experimental literature investigating the impact of civic education or other interventions designed to further democratization processes. And the fact that the evaluation was also national in scope, encompassing some 181 workshops conducted by over one-third of the NCEP’s participating NGOs, makes the study that much more distinctive, as it attained impressive degrees of both internal *and* external validity.